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1 Introduction
In the standard entry-exit problem of a rm with stochastic cash ow, the optimal
policy requires the rm to sustain negative cash ows indenitely. Our main question
is how rms should behave if they have a limited capability of paying for losses. The
solution is a policy for exit and dividend payments that depends on the current levels
of both cash ow and cash holdings.
In the standard problem, the potential for future prots and the irreversibility of
exit make it optimal for a rm to accept negative cash ows up to some point.1 In the
absence of nancial constraints cash holdings are irrelevant, and the optimal policy is
simply a negative threshold level of cash ow below which the rm exits. However, the
value of continuation is partly due to future paths where cash ow remains negative
for arbitrarily long periods of time. It seems realistic in many contexts that a rm
with a long history of losses would nd it di¢ cult to keep raising more funds. But as
soon as there is a limit to a rms ability to sustain losses the rms problem changes
in a fundamental way.
To make our point clear, we initially model the liquidity constraint as the com-
plete inability to raise new funds. The rm has an initial stock of cash that can only
be augmented with retained earnings. A rm without cash and with a negative cash
ow is forced to exit immediately regardless of its future prospects, so rms have an
incentive to hoard cash in order to avoid ine¢ cient exit in the future. This precau-
tionary saving is costly due to the liquidity premium cash holdings earn interest at
a rate below the discount rate. Therefore, if the rm is su¢ ciently safe from forced
exit with su¢ ciently high cash ow and/or cash holdings it is optimal to pay out
some of the cash to the owners. Thus, besides a¤ecting the optimal exit policy, the
liquidity constraint also generates the optimal dividend policy. We characterize the
optimal policy and analyze its dependence on the properties of the cash ow process.
Our numerical results show that a small liquidity premium has a large impact on
optimal rm behavior.
We do not explicitly model the causes behind the liquidity constraint. One natural
cause of liquidity constraints is asymmetric information: it can be di¢ cult for a rm
or a manager to credibly convey to investors that it has potential for prots.2 Aside
1See e.g. Chapter 7 in Dixit and Pindyck (1993).
2For evidence on the importance of liquidity constraints for rms, see for example Evans and
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from the liquidity constraint, our model has no other imperfections such as agency
problems. The optimal policy maximizes the value of the rm to its owners, taking
as given the lack of further cash injections by the owners. In an extension to our
model we assume that raising external funds incurs a transaction cost; in e¤ect the
basic model assumes that this cost is prohibitive.
Our model builds on elements from the literature on the optimal exercise of op-
tions, where the seminal papers are by McDonald and Siegel (1986) who model the
optimal timing of investment under uncertain cash ow, and by Dixit (1989) who
analyzes the rms optimal entry and exit decisions in the same framework. A large
number of extensions to various directions is summarized by Dixit and Pindyck (1993).
Our paper extends this line of research further by adding a liquidity constraint that
may prevent the rm from covering operating losses. As we are interested in envi-
ronments where the rms future prospects vary over time, we need a state variable
for the rms current cash ow (income level). On the other hand, to model a con-
straint for covering losses, we need another state variable for the rms current cash
holdings (wealth). The state-variable in our problem is inherently two-dimensional:
any simplication that reduces the problem to one state-variable would assume away
the problem we are interested in.3
Our model leads to a free boundary partial di¤erential equation problem that
does not have an analytical solution. Instead of attempting to solve the free bound-
ary problem directly, we formulate it as a recursive dynamic programming problem in
discrete time. We show that the problem can be easily solved by value function iter-
ation. The solution has an intuitive interpretation and we illustrate its comparative
statics properties graphically.
There are two related papers that address the e¤ects of liquidity constraints on
optimal exercise of real options. Boyle and Guthrie (2003) analyze the optimal timing
of investment when uncertain wealth prior to the investment a¤ects the rms ability
to nance the investment. Our paper, by contrast, focuses on post-investment cash
ow uncertainty and its e¤ects on dividends and exit. A special case of our model,
where we assume away the liquidity premium, has close resemblance to the problem of
Jovanovic (1989), Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen (1994), and Zingales (1998).
3By contrast, in setups where the wealth increments are i.i.d., the rms future prospects never
change so the problem becomes one-dimensional and yields closed-form solutions; see e.g. Radner
and Shepp (1996) or Décamps and Villeneuve (2007).
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a nancially constrained rm in Mello and Parsons (2000), who analyze the optimal
hedging policy for a rm that cannot raise new funds. The rms problem includes
choosing the optimal exit policy, but there is no incentive to ever pay out dividends.
Our setup is also to some extent related to the models of precautionary saving. The
seminal papers on precautionary saving by Zeldes (1989) and Deaton (1991) analyze
the problem of optimal lifetime consumption. Under serially correlated income shocks
the state space is two-dimensional (savings and expected income) as in our model;
the key di¤erence is that consumers do not face an exit decision. For consumers,
precautionary saving results from the convexity of marginal utility, whereas in our
model it results from the threat of forced exit.
We also analyze the impact of the liquidity constraint on market equilibrium when
cash ow uncertainty faced by individual rms is due to idiosyncratic productivity
shocks. Our concept of competitive industry equilibrium with entry and exit of rms
is essentially that of Hopenhayn (1992). In our setup there is an obvious post-entry
overselectivity e¤ect in terms of productivity: some marginally productive rms that
should survive a temporary negative cash ow exit due to insu¢ cient funds (or more
accurately, as well see, to preempt forced exit). However, the liquidity constraint also
creates a price distortion which causes some formerly productive rms with su¢ cient
cash to stay on even when their productivity falls below the socially e¢ cient exit
threshold. This is a type of survival of the fattest as coined by Zingales (1998).
We show that when the entry cost is su¢ ciently low the liquidity constraint in fact
lowers the average productivity of rms in the industry.
In the next section we characterize the problem of the rm, and then in section
3 we solve the rms optimal policy under the liquidity constraint and analyze its
comparative statics. The implications of the liquidity constraint for a competitive
industry are analyzed in section 4.
2 The Problem of the Firm
The rm faces a stochastic revenue x that follows geometric Brownian motion:
dx = x dt+ x dw, (1)
where dw is the increment of a standardized Wiener process (i.e., with mean zero
and variance dt). The rm earns a prot ow  = x   c where the xed cost c is a
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positive constant. Exit is irreversible and without an additional exit cost. (The entry
decision will only show up in industry equilibrium.) The objective is to maximize the
expected present value of the income to the owners, discounted at rate  > .
There are two fundamentally di¤erent cases. An unconstrained rm can accumu-
late negative prots indenitely if needed. The problem of an unconstrained rm is
described by the standard real option model of optimal exit. The sole decision is to
choose the exit threshold for x, so there is no meaningful decision for when (if at all)
to retain cash or pay dividends. This is the e¢ cient benchmark for our analysis.
A constrained rm has to worry about its ability to cover negative prots, because
it is forced to exit if it has no cash while it faces a negative cash ow. The optimal
exit policy depends both on revenue x and cash holdings s. The rms cash holdings
are augmented by the prot ow and by the interest earned on the cash holdings at
rate r  . If r <  then the cash held by the rm is less productive than other
assets available to the owners, so the rm faces a meaningful decision of how to pay
dividends. The downside of paying dividends is that reduced cash holdings lower
the capability to cover any future losses. We start by assuming that the liquidity
constraint is very stark in the sense that it is not possible to inject more cash into
the rm. We then extend the model to the case where new funds may be raised at
some transaction cost; the basic version can be thought of as a special case in which
such transaction costs are prohibitive.
2.1 Unconstrained Firm
The unconstrained rm will exit if the cash ow becomes too negative. The value
function for the unconstrained rm is dened by the familiar di¤erential equation:
V = x  c+ xVx + 
2
2
x2Vxx (2)
(see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck 1993, Chapter 7) with the constraints that Vx be con-
tinuous ("smooth pasting") and have a nite limit. This ODE has a well-known
closed-form solution. The optimal exit threshold is
x =

1 + 

1  


c, (3)
where  =  1
2
+

2
+
s
1
2
  
2
2
+
2
2
> 0.
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The unconstrained value function is
V (x) =
(
x
( )
 
x
x

+ x
    c for x  x;
0 for x < x:
(4)
2.2 Constrained Firm
The constrained rm has an initial cash balance that is exogenous to the problem.
Cash earns interest at rate r  . When the rm is not paying dividends, the cash
ow is the sum of the prot ow and the interest income ow
ds
dt
= x  c+ rs. (5)
The rm is forced to exit if x  c and s = 0. If the rm chooses to exit when s > 0,
then the remaining cash is paid out as the liquidation value.
The rm may at any point in time choose from three policy options. First, the
rm may exit, which is irreversible, and results in the exit value s. Second, the rm
may continue while paying a positive dividend to the owners. Third, the rm can
continue without paying dividend. The solution to the rms problem is a division
of the (x; s) space into regions in each of which one of the three policy options is
optimal.
Figure 1 shows a schematic view of the optimal policy (we will explain shortly why
it must look like this). Given the policy, the life span of the rm is a stochastic path
in the (x; s)  space. The rm mainly ventures inside the continuation region, where
its law of motion is given by equations (1) and (5). The rm never ventures inside
the dividend region, because dividend payments move it immediately down along s-
axis to the boundary of that region. When x is su¢ ciently high, the dividend region
reaches all the way to the s = 0 line, where the rm operates with zero cash holdings
and continually pays out all of the prot ow as dividends. The life span ends when
the rm hits the boundary of the exit region for the rst time.
We will now explain why the optimal policy takes the form depicted in Figure 1.
[ Figure 1 here ]
Continuation Region
The point in accumulating cash is to use it as a bu¤er that prevents ine¢ cient exit.
To see this, consider a situation where the rms current cash holding s is small but
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strictly positive, and where the prot ow is exactly zero, i.e. x = c. The rm
is not currently making losses and there is a positive option value associated with
future prots, so it can not be optimal to exit. Neither can it be optimal to pay
out s as dividends, because this would cause the rm to immediately move down
to the point (x = c; s = 0), which means that the rm is forced to exit within the
"next instant" thus losing the option value. Therefore, there must be a non-empty
continuation region, where it is optimal to retain cash inside the rm despite the
di¤erence between the discount rate and the rate of return on cash holdings.
Now lets consider the properties of the value function in the continuation region.
Dene the value of the constrained rm V (x; s) as gross of the cash holdings, so
the value at the time of exit is V (x; s) = s. Using Itos lemma, we can write the
di¤erential dV as:4
dV = Vsds+ Vxdx+
1
2
Vxx (dx)
2 . (6)
Taking the expectation and letting dt be small yields:
E (dV ) = Vsds+ Vxxdt+
1
2
Vxx
2x2dt,
where ds is from (5). The Bellman equation is V (x; s) = E (V + dV ) = (1 + dt),
which can be solved for V dt = E (dV ), leading to the following PDE:
V = (x  c+ rs)Vs + xVx + 
2
2
x2Vxx. (7)
Note that this PDE does not contain a cash ow term. The reason is that in the
continuation region, the cash ow between the rm and its owners is zero: Positive
cash ow adds to the cash balance and negative ow subtracts from it.
The PDE (7) does not have a closed-form solution. Further, it is valid only in the
continuation region, the boundaries of which must be optimally chosen as part of the
solution. We will next discuss the properties of these boundaries, which constitute
the optimal exit and dividend policies. The numerical solution of the problem is
discussed in Section 3.
Exit Policy
The liquidity constraint can only reduce the continuation value of the rm, so the
constrained rm should certainly exit whenever the unconstrained would, i.e., when
4In the Appendix we show how this derivation is done more intuitively, if in a lengthier fashion,
using the limiting case of a discerete-time binary process.
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x  x. In addition, the rm is forced to exit when it has no cash to cover the current
loss, i.e., when (x  c; s = 0). This gives a xed boundary for the value of the rm:
V (x; 0) = 0 for x  c. (8)
On the other hand, the rm should clearly never exit while current prots are
positive (x > c). Now, consider a rm with a very small s and with x slightly above
x. This rm could in principle continue. However, as ds=dt < 0, the rm is just
about to run out of cash and be forced to exit at the next instant. For su¢ ciently
small s the rm is so unlikely to bounce back to a positive cash ow before s hits zero
that it is better o¤ exiting immediately and just taking the remaining s. Thus, there
must be a boundary between exit and continuation regions that lies strictly above
s = 0 for x < c. We denote this exit threshold by ~s (x), dened in x 2 [xmin; c] where
xmin is, practically dened, the lowest revenue at which the rm ever continues. For
x < c, the lower is x, the less valuable the continuation value of the rm, and thus
the higher the s required for continuation to be optimal, so ~s0 (x) < 0 in x 2 (xmin; c).
We call exiting when x > x and s > 0 precautionary exit.
Inside the continuation region the value of the rm must exceed the exit value s.
At the exit boundary the rm is indi¤erent between taking the exit value and the
continuation value, so
V (x; ~s (x)) = s. (9)
Smooth pasting at the exit policy requires
Vs (x; ~s (x)) = 1, (10)
Vx (x; ~s (x)) = 0. (11)
The only way in which a rm following the optimal policy can extinguish all funds
is to hit exactly the zero-ow-zero-stock point for cash, fx; sg = fc; 0g. Thus the
constrained rm will experience a forced exit with probability 0.5 All exit by liquidity
constrained rms is precautionary.
5The rms position in (x; s)-space cannot evolve along the boundaries of the continuation region
because, if s = 0 and x > c then ds > 0, and if x < c then the rm exits if it hits the boundary
fx; ~s (x)g.
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Dividend Policy
When r < , holding cash is costly. The benet of holding cash is that it may allow
the rm to avoid a forced exit in the future when the option value of continuation
would still be positive. This benet is bounded above by V  (c), the unconstrained
continuation value at the zero prot ow. Since the cost of holding cash increases
without bound in s, there exists, for any x, some s high enough so that it is better
to stop accumulating cash. This threshold value, denoted s^(x), denes the boundary
between the continuation region and the dividend region. We call it the dividend
threshold. The value of the rm above the dividend threshold must be:
V (x; s) = V (x; s^(x)) + (s  s^(x)) , when s > s^(x).
For su¢ ciently high x the possibility of forced exit is so remote that it is not worth
holding on to any cash. We denote the threshold above which it is optimal to not hold
any cash by x^max. In the limit x!1, the prospect of forced exit becomes irrelevant,
and thus the value of the rm must converge to the value of the unconstrained:
lim
x!1
V (x; s) = V (x) + s. (12)
At the dividend threshold, cash is equally valuable inside as it is outside the rm,
where one dollar is of course worth one dollar. Thus, the value matching condition
Vs (x; s^(x)) = 1 (13)
must hold at the dividend threshold. The associated smooth-pasting condition re-
quires
Vss (x; s^(x)) = 0, (14)
Vxs (x; s^(x)) = 0: (15)
The rm is constrained at the margin only in the continuation region; there having a
dollar more would increase the value of the rm by more than a dollar: Vs (x; s) > 1.
When the rm hits the dividend threshold from inside it pays out just enough cash
to not cross the boundary. However, if the rm starts at s > s^(x), then it immediately
gives the excess s  s^(x) as a lump sum dividend. A lump sum dividend is also paid
out as the liquidation value upon precautionary exit. Note that if a rm that enters
the industry at revenue level x = x0 then it can choose its initial cash holdings and
s0 = s^(x0) is the optimal choice.
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Special Case: r = 
Consider now the special case in which there is no liquidity premium: r = . Hoarding
cash is now costless, so it can never be strictly optimal to pay dividends. The optimal
policy is thus dened by dividing the (x; s)  space between the exit region and
the continuation region. The qualitative properties of the exit region and the exit
threshold ~s (x) are the same as with r < .
Note that holding cash inside the rm can be strictly optimal only when there is
a positive probability of being forced to exit in the future. Of course, no matter how
high x, falling below x remains possible. But the rm would become irreversibly
unconstrained if it were to accumulate so much cash that it could use the interest
income from its cash holdings to cover what would be the worst-case losses under the
optimal unconstrained policy. The worst-case loss under the unconstrained policy is
x   c forever, so this escape level of cash is
s =  x
   c
r
. (16)
This means that a xed boundary condition
V (x; s) = V  (x) + s (17)
now replaces the free boundary s^(x) seen in the r <  case. For s  s, the rm is
indi¤erent between paying dividends or not and V (x; s) = V  (x) + s. Since the rm
is then in e¤ect unconstrained, the exit policy is the same as for an unconstrained
rm: exit if and only if x  x.
This case without liquidity costs is similar to the setup of a nancially constrained
rm in Mello and Parsons (2000), save for minor di¤erences.6 Instead of a boundary
condition like (17), they have a limiting condition by which the value of the rm
approaches that of the unconstrained rm as the cash balance approaches innity.
We believe that they err by not taking into account that the rm would become
unconstrained at a nite level of cash balances.
In most dynamic agency models either expected productivity is constant or sav-
ing by the agent is assumed away outright. However, DeMarzo and Sannikov (2008)
assume that the agent is able to save and her expected productivity varies stochasti-
cally. They show that the principal nds it optimal to impose a liquidity constraint
6They study optimal hedging, namely how rms should use futures contracts on an asset that is
correlated with their prots to reduce the risk of ine¢ cient exit.
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on the agent that may cause her to exit in states where it is not rst-best optimal,
which makes the environment ostensibly similar to ours. However, precautionary exit
does not arise in their setup because the expected cash ow faced by the agent is
assumed to be always positive.7
2.3 Generalization: New Cash Injections
Next we extend the model by allowing the rm to increase its cash holdings at some
transaction cost. Specically, the rm can at any point in time raise any amount s
of new cash at cost  + ( + 1) s, where  > 0 is the xed and   0 the marginal
transaction cost. In terms of Figure 1, the raising of new capital allows the rm to
jump directly upwards in the state space (x; s). This could only be optimal when the
rm would otherwise face immediate forced exit (s = 0 and x < 0) because otherwise
the transaction cost can still be postponed and, with luck, even avoided.
If the rm decides to incur the transaction cost, then its optimal target level of
capital is
s+ (x) = argmax
s
fV (x; s)  (1 + ) sg . (18)
The target level s+ equalizes the marginal cost of new cash and its marginal value
at the rm, Vs (x; s+ (x)) = 1 + . Since transaction costs are independent of x, the
region where capital is raised is an interval fs = 0; x 2 [x+min; 0]g, where x+min 2 (x; 0).
The lowest x where the rm replenishes its capital, x+min, is the point where the value
of exit (zero on the s = 0 line) is equal to the value of continuing from fx; s+ (x)g,
net of the transaction cost of moving there.
V
 
x+min; 0

= V
 
x+min; s
+
 
x+min
     (1 + ) s+ = 0. (19)
Figure 2 depicts the optimal policy for a rm that faces positive but not prohibitive
transaction costs. The qualitative di¤erence to Figure 1 is the capital-raising line and
the associated target curve s+ (x) directly above. Still, for su¢ ciently low cash ow
x the rm will nd it optimal to exit rather than add capital.
[ Figure 2 ]
7Negative realizations of cash ow are possible in their setup in which cumulative cash ow follows
Brownian motion and expected cash ow reacts to realized cash ows, but they rule out expected
losses by assuming that the e¢ cient exit threshold level of prots is positive.
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The xed cost  induces the rm to raise new cash in lumps. The liquidity cost
of holding cash makes it desirable to limit the cash holdings, so without a xed cost
rms raise new capital continuously just to o¤set any negative prot ow. However,
a marginal cost  > 0 still reduces the value of continuation and distorts the exit
threshold above x.
In the absence of a marginal transaction cost it is optimal to "jump" all the way
to the dividend boundary, where Vs = 1 by denition. The unconstrained case is
the limiting case where both the xed cost  and the marginal transaction cost  of
raising capital are zero. The constrained case where the rm will never raise additional
capital results when the costs parameters are su¢ ciently high. This happens when
(; ) are such that
max
s
fV (0; s)  (1 + ) s  g  0: (20)
Hence this setup encompasses both the constrained and unconstrained cases of the
basic model.
A literal interpretation of the model is of a risk-neutral owner-entrepreneur who
allocates her wealth between two assets; one liquid that can be used to pay o¤possible
losses, and another illiquid asset that yields a higher rate of return but can only be
turned into liquid form at a transaction cost. The entrepreneur has deep pockets in
terms of the illiquid asset, but the transaction cost makes it desirable to hold some
liquid assets as well and in some circumstances rather fold the rm than pay another
transaction cost.
3 Solving the Firms Optimal Policy
The PDE dened by (7) and the various free boundary conditions cannot be solved
analytically. To solve the rms problem we turn to a discrete-time approximation
of the problem and solve it numerically. In the binomial process approximation of
geometric Brownian motion the evolution of x is governed by
x (t+) =
8<: x (t) e
p
 with probability q = 1
2

1 +
 2
2

p


x (t) e 
p
 with probability 1  q
(21)
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where  is the length of the time period.8 The evolution of the cash balance is now
s (t+) = (s (t)   (t)) (1 + r) + (x (t)  c) (22)
where  (t) 2 [0;s (t)] is the dividend paid at time t. The dividend cannot be so
high as to make the cash holdings negative at any point in time, so the maxi-
mum feasible dividend, restricted by min fs (t+) ; s (t)g  0, is s (t)  s (t)+
min f0; (x (t)  c)= (1 + r)g.
The value function of the rm, stated in recursive form, is
V (x (t) ; s (t) jt) =
max
8>><>>:
s (t) ;
max2[0;s]
n
 + 1
1+
[EV (x (t+) ; s (t+) jt+)]
o
;
maxs+2[s(t);1) fV (x (t) ; s+jt)     (1 + ) (s+   s (t))g
9>>=>>; (23)
where s (t+) is from (22).
The recursion in (23) satises Blackwells su¢ cient conditions so V (x; sjt) is a
contraction mapping. Thus it can be solved by iterating backwards in time: Starting
from an arbitrary VT (x; sjT ) the value function converges to the unique solution
V (x; s).9
Marginal value of cash holdings
In order to understand the nature of the rms problem, it is useful to digress for
a moment and consider the marginal value of cash holdings. Think of the cash
holdings as a stockpile of dollars, and the rm as using the last-in-rst-out principle
in managing this stockpile (i.e., the rm only ever touches the top of the pile). Given
that there is a liquidity cost to holding cash it may seem surprising that the rm runs
out of cash with probability zero. After all, at every point in time, the bottom dollar
incurs the same liquidity cost as any other dollar. Why keep a dollar that is almost
surelynever used? Why not use an otherwise similar policy but with slightly lower
cash holdings, thus saving the liquidity cost on the last dollar while allowing the cash
8This way of discretizing geometric Brownian motion was inspired by Cox, Ross and Rubinstein
(1979).
9A natural starting point for the backward induction is V (x; sjT ) = s: This means that the
problem is turned into a nite-horizon problem with forced exit in the last period. By increasing T
the value function at t = 0 converges to that of the innite horizon problem.
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to run out with positive probability? To understand the answer, note that the last
dollar would only ever be called upon in the vicinity of fc; 0g, i.e., when the ow prot
is zero and the cash holdings are down to the last dollar. At this point the marginal
contribution of cash to the value of the rm is extremely high. In fact, considering
ever smaller ", Vs approaches innity at fc; "=2g because an epsilonmore of cash
would allow the rm to continue, while without cash it is forced to quit and take zero
value. Note that by surviving to fc; "=2g the rm enters a region where ds > 0 so
being able to continue immediately gives a signicant chance of drifting away from
the danger zone. Figure 3 shows selected derivatives of the value function, including
Vs in the top-left panel10. Similarly, the cross-partial Vsx exhibits an extreme reversal
from large positive to large negative values near fc; 0g. To the left of the zero-prot
zero-cash point, a slight improvement of cash ow leads to an extremely large increase
in the marginal value of cash, as it improves substantially the probability that even
a very small cash reserve will su¢ ce to save the rm from running out of cash in the
immediate future. To the right of that point, the rm is drifting toward safety as
ds > 0 so it is suddenly much less likely that the rm would end up needing the last
dollar and the impact of better cash ow on the marginal value of cash is extremely
negative.
[ Figure 3 here ]
3.1 Comparative Statics of Optimal Policy
Next we investigate how the rms optimal policy depends on the parameters r; ; .
We do this comparison by varying one parameter at a time from a set of baseline
parameters, r = 0:05,  = 0:1,  = 0,  = 0:25. (Transaction cost parameters  and 
are, for now, assumed to be prohibitively high). The results are depicted in Figure 4.
The solid lines mark the borders of the continuation region in the liquidity constrained
case, and the dashed line marks the optimal exit threshold in the unconstrained case.11
The left hand panel of Figure 4 shows the impact of varying the return on rms
cash holdings, r. As r gets smaller it becomes costlier to hold cash so continuation is
10The gure is calculated under the baseline parameters (see Section 3.1), but it remains qualita-
tively similar as long as r < .
11The program for solving the optimal policy is available at http://www.hse-econ./murto.
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everywhere less attractive and the continuation region shrinks. The optimal dividend
policy is extremely sensitive to r for values near . The case r =  = 0:1 results in the
escape level of cash s = 3:24 from (16). This is much higher than the highest cash
holdings that the rm would ever keep even at r = 0:0999.12 I.e., the optimal policy
approaches the limiting case r =  very slowly. This is understandable because the
limiting case is qualitatively di¤erent. The value x^max above which the rm optimally
holds no cash is nite for all r < , but if r =  then the rm will not stop holding
cash no matter how high x. The dividend boundary s^ hits the x-axis at a nite value
x^max for all r <  but the limiting value of x^maxwhen r  !  is innity and the
dividend boundary limits to a horizontal half-line that begins at fx; sg. The high
sensitivity of optimal policy to r near  means that, even when the liquidity premium
is approximately zero, the optimal behavior of rms is not approximated by a model
where the liquidity cost is completely assumed away.
The top right panel of Figure 4 shows the relation of the optimal policy and the
volatility of the cash ow process. As is typical, higher volatility makes it optimal
to accept bigger losses because it increases the upside potential while the downside
is still protected by the exit option. In terms of the optimal policy, the increased
option value shows up as an enlarged continuation region. This is already visible
in the unconstrained problem, where the exit threshold xis decreasing in . In the
constrained problem, the dividend boundary shifts out to the right because, at any
given x, higher volatility also increases the risk of facing forced exit within any given
period of time.
The bottom right panel shows the e¤ect of varying , the percentage drift of the
cash ow process. Higher  increases the option value at any given level of losses, as
the rm is more likely to bounce back to positive prots within any given period of
time. However, as higher  also makes the rm safer at any given point by making it
less likely that forced exit would threaten it within any given time it is not obvious
that a higher  should also shift out the dividend boundary. However, we have found
no examples of the opposite.
[ Figure 4 here ]
12The numerical solution converges extremely slowly when r is near . This limits our ability to
solve the optimal policy for values of r closer to but strictly below :
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3.2 Comparative Statics with Cash Injections
Next we investigate the impact of transaction costs on optimal policy while holding
other parameters constant at the baseline levels. The optimal policy is depicted
in Figure 5 under four combinations of the transaction cost parameters (,). The
basic model is equivalent to any combination of  and  where transaction costs are
prohibitive in the sense that the rm would never add new capital; the optimal policy
under prohibitive costs is depicted by a dotted curve for reference.13
The top left panel of Figure 5 shows a benchmark case where both xed and
marginal transaction costs are at intermediate levels. The top right panel considers
an increase in xed cost and the bottom left panel an increase in marginal cost,
compared to the benchmark case. In each case the exit boundary is further left than
under prohibitive costs, as the threat of forced exit is not as grave with the possibility
to raise new capital. The lower the transaction costs, the further the exit boundary
shifts towards the unconstrained exit threshold (which is depicted by the vertical
dashed line). Similarly, the dividend boundary shifts down when it is cheaper to
raise new capital. Intuitively, there is less need to hold cash (and pay the associated
liquidity cost) as it can more cheaply be obtained later when necessary.
The bottom right panel shows the optimal policy when both  and  are very low.
There, as it is very cheap to add cash whenever it is necessary, it becomes possible
to reduce the liquidity cost and never hold very much cash. At the same time, the
exit threshold approaches the e¢ cient threshold. Closer to the limiting case, where
both transaction costs approach zero, the continuation region approaches the half-line
fx  x  0; s = 0g. The limiting case looks like the standard textbook case with no
cash, except that zero is the strict optimum for cash holdings.
The behavior of the target cash curve fx; s+ (x)g is complicated by the opposing
impacts of  and . The last acquired dollar of cash must match the marginal trans-
action cost, so Vs = 1 +  must hold at the target curve. If  = 0 then the target
cash curve coincides with a section of the dividend boundary, where Vs = 1. Higher 
means that the cash infusion should be smaller; in terms of the graph this means that
the target curve is further below the dividend boundary. By contrast, higher  makes
13Hennessy and Whited (2007) estimate that (nancial companies excluded) the marginal cost of
raising new equity is  = 0:053 for large companies and  = 0:12 for small, and that xed costs are
$38; 900 and $95; 100 respectively.
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it attractive to get a bigger infusion of cash, in order to diminish and postpone the
prospects of having to incur the xed cost again. At the same time higher  reduces
the continuation value so the interval where cash is raised contracts.
[ Figure 5 here ]
4 Industry Equilibrium
We saw in Section 2 how a liquidity constraint causes rms to exit at higher levels
of current revenue compared to unconstrained rms. It might therefore seem obvious
that, at the level of an entire industry, the liquidity constraint would cause there
to be fewer but on average more productive rms. However, as we next show, this
partial equilibrium reasoning is incorrect once we take into account the impact that
the liquidity constraint has on the levels of revenue in competitive equilibrium.
In order to analyze the impact of the liquidity constraint on a competitive industry,
we use the denition of industry equilibrium similar to Hopenhayn (1992).14 We
assume that revenue x depends on rm-specic output or productivity z and an
endogenous industry-specic output price p, so that x = pz. Productivity z follows
geometric Brownian motion dz = z dt + z dw, with the shocks dw independent
across rms. New rms of known productivity z0 can be established by paying an
entry cost .15 In the constrained case new rms enter with initial cash holdings s0,
which we treat as a parameter of the problem. To guarantee the existence of steady
state, we assume an exogenous death rate >  at which rms are forced to exit
with their cash holdings as the exit value (see Appendix for details).16 In steady
state, both the dying and the endogenously exiting rms are replaced by new rms
of type fz0; s0g.
14Financial constraints are introduced to a similar setting by Gomes (2001) to study the relation of
cash ow and investment, and by Cooley and Quadrini (2001) to study the age-conditional relation
of growth and rm size. Miao (2005) analyzes the impact of a distortionary tax on optimal capital
structure with a similar model.
15The value z0 > 0 can be chosen without loss of generality, as it amounts to setting the units of
measurement of z.
16The risk of exogenous exit changes the rms optimal policy slightly compared to Section 2: the
rms discount the future at rate + instead of  and the Bellman equation of the constrained rm
includes a term s on the right hand side of (7).
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The industry faces a downward sloping demand curve for its output. Price p is
determined by the entry condition of new rms: It must adjust to eliminate expected
rents to entrants. Firms are atomistic, hence there is no aggregate uncertainty, p is
constant, and individual rms in e¤ect just face the revenue process (1). It follows
that, for given parameters of the rms problem, the optimal policy is xed in the
(x; s) state space. In the unconstrained case this means that the equilibrium price
of output p is solved implicitly from V  (pz0) = ; where V  is from (4). For
constrained rms the value at entry must cover both the entry cost and the initial
cash injection. Equilibrium p is determined from V (pz0; s0) =  + s0, where V is
obtained numerically as described in the previous section. The constraint reduces
welfare so it distorts p upwards because, due to perfect competition, welfare is purely
a matter of consumer surplus.17 There are three possible channels for the distortion:
higher aggregate entry cost (due to higher turnover), lower productivity, and higher
liquidity costs.
To understand why the impact of the liquidity constraint on mean productivity is
ambiguous, consider, for simplicity, a world where entering rms have no cash holdings
(s0 = 0). The position of rms in (z; s)-space is illustrated in Figure 6. Entry level z0
is at the point to the right of the zero-prot level (z = c=p) where the continuation
value matches the entry cost. As price is distorted upwards, the lowest type to
ever continue (zmin) is below the unconstrained exit threshold (z), even though the
associated revenue level is higher (Recall xmin > x in Figure 1). The price distortion
makes it optimal for rms with su¢ cient cash reserves to continue at productivity
levels that would trigger exit in the unconstrained world. The light shaded region
(ine¢ cient survival) covers rms that would exit in the unconstrained solution but
stay in under the liquidity constraint. The dark region (ine¢ cient exit) covers rms
that are more productive than the unconstrained exit threshold z but exit due to
the liquidity constraint. Whether mean productivity is increased or decreased by a
liquidity constraint depends on which of these two e¤ects dominates.18
[ Figure 6 here ]
17We do not model the shape of the demand curve, as we are not interested in the aggregate level
of output, but rather in its distribution across rms. The industry as a whole has constant returns
to scale, so demand only matters for the mass of rms.
18If s0 is su¢ ciently high and  not too high then z0 2 (z; c=p) and the picture is more compli-
cated, as some of ine¢ ciently exiting rms are replaced by less productive rms.
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Numerical Results Selected steady state outcomes are reported in Figure 7. Each
outcome is reported for those combinations of entry cost  and starting cash s0 that
result in rms entering inside the continuation region. Other parameters are held at
the baseline levels used in Section 3.19 The assumption that transaction costs are
prohibitively high is made in order to obtain a clear contrast between the constrained
and unconstrained cases: Varying  and  between zero and prohibitive levels covers
the entire ground between the two cases in a continuous manner, as discussed in
Section 3.2. Blank regions correspond to s0 so high that entering rms would be in
the dividend region; the outcomes for points in the blank region are thus exactly the
same as in the highest colored point directly below. Values of  that are outside the
gures result in such high p that, in terms of Figure 1, the position of entrants is to
the right of xmax.
The top panels show the output price and mean productivity of rms; the middle
panels show the same values relative to the unconstrained benchmark. The liquidity
constraint is harsher when s0 is small, so the relative distortion is always decreasing
in s0 as the constraint becomes milder. However, there is a subtle interaction with the
entry cost . If  is small then p is low and the prot level of entering rms is low or
even negative, so newborn rms enter near the exit boundary and immediately face
an acute threat of exit. By contrast, when  is high then entrants have a large safety
margin in terms of initial revenue making any liquidity constraint less important. The
relative impact of the constraint is highest when both s0 and  are low: the constraint
is harsh and the safety margin low. At high values of  the level contours are almost
vertical, reecting the safety margin e¤ect that reduces the impact of the liquidity
constraint.
[ Figure 7 here ]
Mean productivity is shown in the top right panels of Figure 7. The liquidity
constraint has a negative impact on mean productivity at low levels of . Thus we
nd a case of survival of the fattestwhen the entry cost is su¢ ciently low, with a
19Baseline parameters are  = 0,  = 0:25,  = 0:1, r = 0:05,  = 0:1, c = 1; z0 = 1. The
combinations f; g that result in prohibitive costs can be obtained by solving () implicitly from
the equality in (20). For example,  = 0:15,  = 0:25 results (just barely) in prohibitive costs.
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magnitude of up to a 15% decrease in mean productivity. At higher levels of  the
impact is positive but eventually the impact of the constraint is attenuated as the
safety margin e¤ect becomes overwhelming. Output is increasing in s0 at low levels of
 and decreasing at high levels of . This means that the output distortion generally
gets smaller as the liquidity constraint gets milder.
Average cash holdings are depicted in the bottom-left panel of Figure 7. An
increase in initial cash holdings naturally tends to increase the mean cash holdings
of all rms in steady state, but, surprisingly, not always. When both  and s0 are
low then an increase in s0 decreases average cash holdings. This is possible because
entering rms have a narrow safety margin. When entrantsprot level is negative
then young rms tend to have cash holdings further below s0. The decrease in p
caused by higher s0 further reduces the cash holdings of young rms, which have a
high steady state population share precisely because many rms exit soon after entry.
For simplicity, we have treated initial cash holdings s0 as a parameter, but our
setup allows it it be endogenized as the entering rmsoptimal response to the trans-
action cost parameters. The lower-right panel of Figure 7 maps the implicit marginal
transaction cost 0 that would result in the given s0 being the optimal choice of the
entering rms, assuming that entering rms can choose any s0  0 at a cost (1+0)s0,
while the cost of raising more cash post-entry is still prohibitive. The dark shaded
region covers the points that do not arise endogenously under any f0; g.
The cross section of rms in our setup bears a resemblance to that in Gomes
(2001), who analyzes industry equilibrium with a model where rms face a mean
reverting productivity process and a cost of raising external funds. In his model
rms are not able to hold cash, but use an excessive stock of physical capital in
e¤ect as a form of precautionary savings, in order to reduce the need for external
nance in the future. Gomes shows that the nonlinearity of the optimal investment
rule generates a spurious correlation between investment and cash ow, irrespective
of whether there are liquidity constraints. In our model cash holdings have a purely
precautionary motive while physical capital is xed (its rental cost is included in
c). Now suppose that the observed value of capital includes assets that are held
for precautionary reasons. It is clear from our results that the contribution of the
precautionary motive to the relation of cash ow and accumulation of capital is then
necessarily non-monotone. To see this, recall Figure 1. Firms with lowest x are
spending their reserves on covering losses (and thus have E[dSjx] < 0), rms with
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intermediate x are on average accumulating cash (E[dSjx] > 0), while at x > xmax
no cash is held and dS = 0.20 Gomespoint is that the power of a cash ow variable
in classic investment regressions arises spuriously when the data is generated in a
structural model. Our model implies that, if the capital stock includes assets held
for precautionary reasons, then the relation between "investment" and cash ow is
nonlinear (indeed non-monotone) even if the relation of physical investment and cash
ow were linear (as it is in our model).
5 Conclusion
We have analyzed the problem of a liquidity constrained rm that faces a stochastic
cash ow. The rm may be forced to exit due to inability to absorb a negative cash
ow, even when the possibility to rebound into prots conveys option value that
would make continuation (socially) optimal. To prevent such ine¢ cient exit, the rm
engages in precautionary saving out of retained earnings, and to pre-empt it the rm
will exit before actually running out of cash. The optimal policy includes both an exit
policy and a dividend policy, which depend on current cash ow and cash holdings.
The obvious selection e¤ect of pre-entry liquidity constraints is to increase the
average productivity of rms in market equilibrium, because the standard for prof-
itable entry is set too high. Similarly, in partial equilibrium, the post-entry liquidity
constraint would seem to distort the average productivity upwards, by weeding out
rms with upside potential that are facing a negative cash ow. We showed that
post-entry liquidity constraints lead also to an opposite phenomenon, where unpro-
ductive rms that have a lot of cash (from earlier success) do not exit soon enough
and end up reducing the average productivity below the e¢ cient benchmark level.
Our steady state calculations showed that the negative e¤ect dominates when entry
costs are su¢ ciently low.
20The same non-monotonicity applies to E[dSjV ] because the contour lines of V are downward-
sloping in (x; s)-space.
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Appendix: Stationary distributions
Unconstrained Case
In the unconstrained case, the steady-state rm distribution and its properties re-
ported in Section 4 can be derived analytically as follows. Denote y  log z: The exit
threshold is y = log z and new rms are born at y0 > y. Taking a discrete time
approximation, y follows the binomial process:
y (t+) =
(
y (t) + y with probability q
y (t) y with probability 1  q
where  is the length of a period, q = 1
2

1 +  
2=2

p


, and y = 
p
. The
steady state condition gives a di¤erence equation for the mass of rms located at an
arbitrary state point y,
(1  ) [qf (y  y) + (1  q) f (y +y)]y + g (y)y = f (y)y,
where f (y)y is the mass of all rms and g (y)y is the mass of newborn rms
at state point y. Taking the limit  ! 0 leads to a di¤erential equation for the
stationary rm density:21
1
2
2f 00 (y)     (1=2)2 f 0 (y)  f (y) + g (y) = 0; (24)
with f (y) = 0 and limy!1 f (y) = 0 as boundary conditions. In our setup g (y) is
positive at y0 and zero elsewhere. The point y0 splices the di¤erential equation into
two regions, with the f (y0) = f0 as a boundary condition in the middle. (f is nite
but not di¤erentiable at y0). The value of f0 can be solved from the condition that
total probability density integrates to one. Combining the boundary conditions with
(24) yields the closed-form solution:
f (y) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 y  y
f0e
  (+)(y y0)
22
 
e
y
2  e
y
2
!
 
e
y0
2  e
y
2
! y < y  y0
f0e
  (+)(y y0)
22 y0 < y
(25)
21See Dixit and Pindyck (1993), chapter 8, section 4.c for more details.
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where   2   2;  =
p
82 + 2, and
f0 =
2


e
y
2   e y

2


e
y0
2   e  ( )y
+(+)y0
22
 : (26)
There is no economically sensible steady state unless z = ey has a nite mean.
Here
R1
y0
eyf (y) dy <1 is a necessary and a su¢ cient condition for the nite mean.
Taking out the terms that are independent of y in (25), the nite mean requirement
becomes Z 1
y0
ey 
(+)y
22 dy <1. (27)
This holds if 22       < 0, which simplies to  > .
Constrained Case
The stationarity proof in the unconstrained case is su¢ cient for the stationarity of
the distribution of z in the constrained process. As s is endogenously bounded by
the optimal dividend policy and, rm by rm, depends deterministically on the his-
tory of z, the fact that z has a stationary distribution su¢ ces for the stationarity
of the joint distribution (z; s). However, now the optimal policy has no closed-form
solution so the steady state distribution must be computed numerically. In the dis-
crete time approximation the life span of each individual rm is a Markov chain in
the discretized state space. Therefore, the steady state distribution is obtained in a
straightforward manner by rst computing the optimal policy of an individual rm,
and then, starting from some initial rm distribution, iterating the rm distribution
according to the state transition equations associated with the policy (where a con-
stant mass of new rms are established at the birth point within each iteration) until
the rm distribution converges to the steady state. Mean output can then be readily
computed.
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   Figure 2. Optimal policy in the general model, where it is possible to raise new capital. 

-0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
P
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
S
Varying r Î 80, 0.05, 0.09,0.099<
-0.5 0.5 1.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
VaryingΣ Î 80.1, 0.25, 0.4<
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
P
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
S
Varying r Î 80, 0.05, 0.09, 0.099, 0.0999, 0.1<
-0.4 -0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
P
0.5
1.0
1.5
S
Varying Μ Î 8-0.05, 0, 0.05 ,0.09<
Figure 4. Optimal policy of a liquidity constrained firm: Comparative statics.
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   Figure 5. Comparative statics of the optimal policy with respect to fixed (ξ) and marginal (γ) cost of raising new capital. 


